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By F. Thomas Schornhorst
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court of the United
States has granted certiorari in a case
that, should the action of the lower
federal courts be affirmed, could have
a heavy impact upon the pre-trial
criminal process in Indiana. The
question presented in Gerstein v.
Pugh, cert. granted 14 Cr. L. Rep.
4107, December 3, 1973,1 is whether
a person who is arrested and held for
trial upon an information filed by the
prosecuting attorney is entitled consti-
tutionally to a post-arrest preliminary
hearing on the issue of probable cause.
The case comes out of Florida
which, like Indiana, permits a wide
range of criminal charges to be
brought by direct information where-
by the prosecutor is the sole determin-
er of whether the formal processes of
the criminal law are to be invoked
against an individual. Indeed, as the
result of recent statutory changes, IC
1971, 35-3.1-1-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-903
(Supp. 1973), Indiana prosecutors are
under no restrictions as to the types of
crimes that may be charged by infor-
mation.
The Florida suit is a class action
initiated in a federal district court by
'The case has a long history in the lower fed-
eral courts under the name of Pugh v. Rainwater,
332 F.Supp. 1109, 336 F.Supp. 490, 355 F.Supp.
1286 (S.D.Fla. 1973), aff'd 13 Cr. L. Rep. 2525
(5th Cir. 1973). Gerstein is the Dade County
Attorney and was one of the several defendants.
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and on behalf of pre-trial detainees
who alleged a violation of their civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Their
most serious objection went to the
prosecutor's practice of filing an infor-
mation on the basis of a police report
and then, without any preceding or
succeeding judicial intervention, is-
suing an order for the arrest of the
defendant, thereby causing lengthy
pre-trial detention of persons unable
to make bond. Of course, this is the
very practice that was held to be un-
constitutional in Kinnaird v. State,
251 Ind. 506, 242 N.E.2d 500 (1958),
on the ground that arrests and
searches incidental thereto are un-
lawful unless the issuance of the war-
rant is preceded by a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause. Also,
Indiana statutes now provide: "When-
ever an information is filed and the
defendant has already been arrested
or otherwise brought within the cus-
tody of the court, the court shall pro-
ceed to determine whether probable
cause existed for the arrest of the de-
fendant unless the issue of probable
cause has previously been determined
by a court issuing a warrant for the
defendant's arrest or by a court hold-
ing a preliminary hearing after the
defendant's arrest." IC 1971, 35-3.1-
1-1(d), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-903(d)
(Supp. 1973).
While the Indiana procedure de-
scribed above would appear to meet
the minimum requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, both the federal
district court and court of appeals
found in Pugh that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
apart from the incorporated Fourth
Amendment standards, requires the
states to afford a person arrested with
or without a warrant a preliminary
hearing within a reasonable time
after he has been deprived of his free-
dom. The basis for this distinction,
while not fully articulated in the
courts' opinions, seems to be the con-
cern that neither lengthy pre-trial de-
tention nor the damaging notoriety of
being formally charged with a crime
should occur without giving the ac-
cused a meaningful opportunity to
contest the existence of probable
cause.
It seems clear from their reliance on
cases such as Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), and Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (both of
which stressed the need for a hearing
in which the person who stands to be
deprived of a significant interest is
provided a fair opportunity to partici-
pate), that the federal courts in Pugh
had in mind as a constitutional pre-
requisite to further criminal proceed-
ings an adversarial hearing. Also, in
this context, minimum due process
standards would include the right to
counsel (Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1 (1970; the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
and the right of the accused to intro-
duce evidence on his or her own be-
half. While the essential issue in such
a hearing would be whether there is
probable cause to believe that an of-
fense has been committed and the
person arrested has committed it, the
preliminary hearing also aids the de-
fendant's pre-trial discovery. Coleman
v. Alabama, supra.
According to Pugh, a preliminary
hearing must be made available to the
accused within a reasonably short time
after arrest, and after the accused has
had a reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare. The hearing could take place
as early as the initial post-arrest ap-
pearance of the accused before a com-
mitting magistrate, but no later than
a few days after the arrest. Of course,
the accused may knowingly and vol-
untarily waive the preliminary hear-
ing.
Of equal significance to the recogni-
tion of the right to a preliminary
hearing itself is the district and cir-
cuit courts' extension of that right to
persons charged with misdemeanors
who, like those who are entitled to
court-appointed counsel under Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972),
face the possibility of imprisonment.
According to the Fifth Circuit, "ex-
cept where misdemeanants are out on
bond or are charged with violating
ordinances carrying no possibility of
pre-trial incarceration, they must be
accorded preliminary hearings." 13
Cr. L. Rep. at 2526.
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HON. CLARENCE G. POWELL,
former Parke County Circuit Judge
and his wife, Emma Powell, residents
of Montezuma, Ind., died Saturday
evening, December 8. Judge Powell,
92, died in Vermillion County Hos-
pital at Clinton, and Mrs. Powell, 87,
died in Holiday Home in Clinton.
Judge Powell received his legal edu-
cation from Indiana University and
had practiced law more than 40 years.
He served on the Parke Circuit Court
Bench from 1956 to 1968. He was a
member of the Indiana State Bar As-
sociation, 1941-1972. In addition to
his legal training and law practice, he
was an authority in the fields of min-
ing and ceramics. At different times
he managed a South American min-
ing operation for the Aluminum Com-
pany of America, and the operations
of the Colorado Coal & Iron Co., in
Colorado. Also he had operated the
former Marion Brickworks at Monte-
zuma, once the world's largest manu-
facturer of face brick for residential
construction.
Judge Powell is survived by a
nephew and Mrs. Powell by one sis-
ter.
WALTER E. PRENTICE, 87, re-
tired Jeffersonville attorney and father
of Dixon W. Prentice, a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Indiana, died De-
cember 7 at his Jeffersonville resi-
dence. The deceased obtained his
legal education, LL.B. 1926, from the
old Jefferson School of Law, now the
law school of the University of Louis-
ville, Kentucky. He had engaged in
general practice until his retirement
some years ago. Two of his three sons,
Robert J. Prentice and Justice Dixon
W. Prentice practiced with him sev-
eral years prior to his retirement.
The deceased had been a member
of the Clark County, Indiana State
and American Bar Associations. His
other memberships included the Wall
Street United Methodist Church, of
Jeffersonville, the Buckner Masonic
Lodge, of Sellersburg, Scottish Rite
and Murat Shrine, at Indianapolis.
Also he was past president of the Jef-
fersonville Lions Club and a past-
district Governor of the Lions organ-
ization.
Additional to the two lawyer sons,
survivors are the wife, Maude Wilson
Prentice; the third son, Dr. Wilson E.
Prentice, also of Jeffersonville; two
daughters, Mrs. Evelyn Joy Goodwin,
Thousand Oaks, Calif., and Mrs.
Edith Alice Dolian, Stamford, Conn.;
14 grandchildren and 14 great grand-
children.
GEORGE H. OSWALT, 64, of In-
dianapolis, state manager of the
claims department of Travelers In-
surance Company, where he had been
employed in legal work for 32 years,
died December 19 of a heart condi-
tion while awaiting arrival of a bus
at 38th and Meridian Streets, in Indi-
anapolis. Mr. Oswalt received his
preparatory education and his degree
in law, LL.B. from Indiana Univer-
sity in 1934. He was a member of the
Indiana State Bar Association and of
Delta Epsilon fraternity, Oriental Ma-
sonic Lodge, Scottish Rite and Murat
Shrine. He was a member and deacon
of Irvington Presbyterian Church.
Survivors include the wife, Helen;
daughter, Mrs. David Denison; son,
Larry, and brothers, Dr. James T. and
Warren W. Oswalt.
EARL WOLFINGER, 79, North
Vernon attorney and minister, died
December I in the Extended Health
Care Center at Columbus, Ind., after
an illness of approximately one year.
A native of the community of Alert,
in Decatur County, he was admitted
to the practice of law in June, 1925,
without having the benefit of formal
legal training in a law school. He had
maintained his law office at North
Vernon.
In June 1956 he was ordained as
a minister of the Christian Union
Church and had held pastorates at
the Wilson's Chapel, Alert and Mt.
Pleasant churches.
The wife, Vera Nicholson Wolfin-
ger, and a son Lawrence Wolfinger,
of Vernon, Ind., survive.
IND. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
WILL BE AT MERRILLVILLE
Dates for the 1974 Indiana Judicial
Conference to be held this spring at
Merrillville are to be decided soon.
The annual meeting, a study confer-
ence of the Hoosier judiciary required
by Act of the Indiana General As-
sembly, is expected to be convened in
April or early May at the Lake Coun-
ty location.
Several weeks ago a premature an-
nouncement had advised that the con-
ference would be held in 1974 at Fort
Wayne. Preliminary arrangements of
the Allen County Bar to cooperate in
providing hospitality for the meeting
have been cancelled.
New rules of judicial procedure,
new laws, affective decision of the
United States and the Indiana Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals,
are likely to be among subjects to re-
ceive attention. Also, there may be
discussions of a proposed new Code
of Judicial Ethics.
CRIMINAL LAW NOTES
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Since Indiana has not incorporated
the preliminary hearing as a necessary
step in its criminal process (IC 1971,
35-4-1-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-704a re-
quires a preliminary hearing only
when a special "preliminary charge"
procedure is invoked), Indiana trial
courts should make contingent plans
to make available preliminary hear-
ings to all persons charged with fel-
onies, and, at the very least, to make
probable cause determinations in
cases of misdemeanants held in pre-
trial detention.
Of course the Supreme Court may
overrule the Fifth Circuit in whole or
in part, or it may find that federal
jurisdiction was improperly invoked
in light of the necessary interfer-
ence with state criminal procedure.
(Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)). However, it would seem pru-
dent to be prepared for an affirmance
of the lower courts' actions and the
necessary changes in Indiana's pre-
trial criminal procedure that will, in
such event, be required.
RES GESTAE
